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Abstract
We study pricing when firms introduce process and product innovations over
time. We set up a model of endogenous productivity and markup under imperfect
competition and dynamic pricing. We estimate it using output price indices
reported by an unbalanced panel of 2,300 Spanish manufacturing firms during
1990-2006. Markups turn out to be procyclical and change with the introduction
of innovations. Firms use innovation to increase margins, but product innovators
are careful to raise prices on new or improved goods. Process innovations tend to
leave prices unchanged, product innovations tend to raise prices and firms that
introduce both tend to decrease them.
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1. Introduction
Economic theory establishes that, under imperfect competition, profit maximizing firms
set prices with a markup over marginal cost.1 This implies at least two ways innovation
impacts prices. On the one hand, marginal cost depends on firm-level productivity
which in turn evolves endogenously according to process and product innovations.2
Process innovations, aimed at reducing cost, are expected to shift the marginal cost
function downwards. Product innovations, in the form of improved or new goods, are
expected to change cost in more heterogeneous ways. For example, quality upgrades
may imply greater production cost, at least temporarily.3
On the other hand, the firm may find that innovation (particularly product innova-
tion) shifts demand and perhaps also its elasticity, thus innovation impacts price via the
decision on the markup. If adjustment costs of prices are present, then innovation plays
a further role in a ecting such costs. A process innovation enlarges the margin without
cost, a product innovation implies costs of information to consumers. The firm is likely
to consider all these factors in deciding the markup over marginal cost under innovation.
There is scarce empirical evidence, however, on the e ects of this consideration.
Thus this paper sets out to study pricing when the firm experiences a sequence of
process and product innovations as a result of its research and development activities.
We construct a model of endogenous productivity and markup under imperfect com-
petition and dynamic pricing. Our model is tailored to the case of monopolistically
1Hall and Hitch (1939) is a departure from this view, in what Ellison (2006) characterizes as an
early contribution to behavioral industrial organization.
2The literature on estimating heterogeneous unobserved productivity with structural methods starts
with Olley and Pakes (1996); see also Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2006). Latest
models allow productivity to be endogenously determined. Peters et al. (2016), for example, model
firms’ marginal cost as depending on process and product innovation in the way that we are going to
adopt in this paper. Aw et al. (2011) and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) are papers in which
endogenous e ciency depends on R&D expenditure.
3For example, the new production may require new labor skills and material qualities, not fully
accounted for in the observable part of cost, that raise observable cost and decrease unobservable
productivity. Similarly, when “learning by doing” is important, firms may lack experience in producing
the new good and unobserved productivity goes down as a result.
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competitive firms, but can be augmented to any type of strategic interactions in pricing
(and estimated if enough data are available). The discrete markup changes induced by
innovation at di erent points in time may a ect profits for the coming years and call for
a dynamic model. In fact this adds to an extensive literature on price changes that has
already given many reasons for which firm-level prices may display inertia4 and shown
it to be empirically relevant.5
In our model firms choose markups. This gives the same outcome as choosing prices
since one variable determines the other. But adopting the choice of markups rather than
prices o ers advantages on obsevability and simplicity. First, firms are multiproduct
and hence the representation of their prices should be cast in terms of price indices,
as their levels are not informative. Markup levels are, however, observable up to the
average variable cost to marginal cost ratio. Second, prices are subject to inaction.
Their changes are typically modeled as a non-continuous function of the degree of
margin disequilibrium, which triggers updating when it reaches a certain level. This
implies modeling the discrete choice of whether to update and then subsequently by how
much. Markups vary continuously in a “passive” way due to periodical cost variations
or inovation-induced changes, even when firms do not update prices. By modeling
markups we model directly the level of the variable the firm is concerned about. Even
4Economists have discussed the rigidity of prices and its consequences at least since Berle and Means
(1932). Models of adjustment costs in prices at the firm level were advanced, for example, in the works
of Barro (1972) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1992) with lumpy costs generating inaction, and in
Rotemberg (1982) with strictly convex costs generating partial adjustment. Carlton (1985) discusses
the issue of price rigidity from the point of view of industrial organization in the first IO Handbook.
A recent contribution to the theory of rigid prices (in the presence of collusion) is Athey and Bagwell
(2008).
5Early works described the micro price-setting of particular industries and cases, e.g. Cechetti
(1986), Carlton (1986), Slade (1991), Lach and Tsiddon (1992) and Kashyap (1995). Slade (1998) and
Aguirregabiria (1999) are full structural dynamic models that estimate firm-level fixed and variable
adjustment costs. Newer evidence has incorporated interindustry studies and surveys on price setting.
Reviews of the extensive accumulated evidence can be found in Alvarez et al. (2006) for Europe and
Klenow and Malin (2010) for the US. Two recent studies using respectively industry and firm-level
data are Goldberg and Hellerstein (2011) and Eichenbaum et al. (2011). The latest is part of a huge
literature that combines detailed micro-evidence with the macro discussion of the neutrality of money.
A recent contribution of this kind is Midrigan (2011).
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if the firm chooses not to change the markup actively we can write its value as a
continuous function of the underlying factors (including adjustment costs).
Identification of the model proceeds as follows. Log price is the sum of the log
of marginal cost plus the log of markup (which may be thought of as the percentage
points corresponding margin). One should estimate at the same time marginal cost
and the markup, as well as the e ects of innovation on both. However, estimating
marginal cost implies estimating unobserved persistent productivity, which cannot be
done consistently without the markup,6 and there is no way to separate e ects of
innovation that impact the markup and the marginal cost in the same equation. Thus
we augment our relationship to estimate simultaneously the log of the ratio price to
average cost. This ratio is observable, independent of productivity and includes the
e ects of innovation on the markup. However, the ratio of price to average cost measures
the markup only up to the elasticities of the variable factors that charaterize marginal
cost. As a result, we have two equations with di erent dependent variables (price
average cost margin and price). Each equation separately cannot identify our variables
of interest (productivity, markups and the e ects of innovation), but their simultaneous
estimation provides identification. In writing the system we specify the markup as the
policy function of the dynamic pricing problem of the firm.
We estimate the model using ouput prices reported over an extended period of time
(17 years) by a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms. The data contain ten (unbal-
anced panel) industry samples, which in total amount to more than 2,300 manufacturing
firms and 20,000 observations during 1990-2006. We have firm-level price indices, con-
structed from the reported yearly output price increases in the markets of the firm. In
addition, we make use of the timing of the process and product innovations introduced
by firms and the relevant information to construct margins, output and input use.
6Marginal cost includes unobserved productivity, and unobserved persistent productivity cannot
be estimated without using an Olley and Pakes (1996)/Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure that
inverts an input demand. Consistent estimation involving this demand needs the knowledge of the
markup, because in imperfect competition input demands depend on market power (Ackerberg, Caves
and Frazer, 2015).
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Our findings can be summarized as follows. The dynamic model whereby firms
adjust markups over time fits the data better than a model of static markups. We
also find that the relevant marginal cost is the short-run marginal cost including labor
adjustment cost. Markups are procyclical, so firms set greater markups when the market
of the firm is in expansion. Markups also change with the introduction of innovations.
We decompose price changes that are due to the variations in marginal cost and the
markup, and compare the e ects of innovation with the case of no innovation (about
50% of observations) as the baseline. Absent innovation, productivity decreases cost
by 1% a year and, simultaneously, the margin experiences a trend reduction of 0.5%
a year. Thus, taken together, the e ects curb the average increase of prices by 1.5%,
although prices still grow due to the underlying trend in observable costs. Process
innovation increases productivity on average by one additional percentage point, but
process innovators cash in on the impact of innovation by not changing the margin (the
margin evolution exceeds almost by one percentage point the evolution of the margin
of non-innovators). Product innovators hardly see cost reduction. But they also tend
to maintain margins, although being careful with the pricing of the new or improved
goods: when costs do increase, they tend to counterbalance by margin decreases. The
simultaneous impact of process and product innovation on prices is di erent from the
sum of the two: it gives similar productivity increases as when firms only introduce
process innovation but is accompanied by an almost 1% additional decrease of the
margin. In sum, relative to the e ects of no innovation, process innovations tend to
leave prices unchanged, product innovations tend to raise prices and the confluence of
the two tend to decrease them.
Our analysis has three main contributions. First, up to our knowledge we are the
first to show how innovations impact pricing and prices at the firm level. Second, we
confirm the presence of adjustment costs in markup and labor, and the importance of
considering them in assessing the impact of innovation on prices. Third, we provide a
way to compute markups consistent with imperfect competition and dynamic pricing;
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the procedure in sum uses the simultaneous estimation of the markup and the relevant
production elasticities.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and
presents descriptive statistics. In Section 3, we lay out the model and in Section 4
we specify the econometric implementation. Section 5 presents the estimation results.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We estimate the model with an unbalanced panel data of manufacturing firms located
in Spain from the Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE, or Survey on Busi-
ness Startegies) survey. This survey is carried out yearly by the SEPI Foundation with
support from the Ministry of Industry. At the beginning of the survey in 1990, 5%
of firms with 10-200 workers were sampled randomly by industry and size strata. The
universe of firms with more than 200 workers were asked to participate and the response
rate is about 70%. In order to preserve representation over the years, firms that exited
the original sample due to death or attrition are replaced by firms with similar charac-
teristics drawn from the current population. In the end, the particular sample we use
spans the period 1990-2006 and covers 2,300 manufacturing firms from ten industries
when restricted to firms with at least two years of data.
Apart from its representation and panel structure, the ESEE survey stands out
from other statistics for the rich and high-quality information pertaining to the firm
and the market environment it faces. The particular information we exploit are each
firm’s detailed accounting data, variations for the input and output prices, technological
activities and the state of the market served by the firm. The technological activities we
7De Loecker and Warzyinski (2012) proposed to carry out the estimation of static markups by first
estimating a production elasticity in the production function and then dividing it by the corrected
ouput share of the input (s) included in the elasticity. As our discussion in this paper makes clear,
consistent estimation of the elasticity under imperfect competition requires the use of the markup in
the inverted demand used for it. The method is hence a ected by circularity.
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examine refer to the introduction of process and product innovations. Specifically, firms
were asked whether during the year they have introduced important modification in the
way products are produced, as well as whether they have introduced new (either new
to the firm or new to the market) or significantly modified products. For the indicator
of the state of the market, market dynamism, firms are asked to assess the situation
(contraction, stability, or expansion) of up to 5 separate markets in which they operate.
We use the index for the main market as a proxy for firm-specific demand shifter.
The firm-level variations for the output price are recorded and computed as follows.
Firms are asked to report the average transaction price (“e ective” price) changes in-
troduced from the previous to the reporting year in percentage points, for its activity
optionally broken down in up to five markets.8 Afterwhich the ESEE computes a global
percentage change of the prices of the firm across markets for each year using a Paasche
type formula (current quantities, changing prices):
% price variation =
Qca 1q
k
WEIGHTk
100+% price variationk
≠ 1
Rdb◊ 100,
where WEIGHTk is the share of sales of market k in total sales.9 We first compute
recursively a price index for each firm from these variations:
Pjt = Pjt≠1(1 +
% price variationt
100 )
with Pjt = 1 when t is the first year of firm j in the sample. When for one firm some
intermediate rate of price growth is missing we interpolate linearly a rate to avoid losing
all observations. We finally normalize Pjt by the average of its values for each firm.10
Price variations in materials are also computed as a Paasche-type index of responses
8Firms decide whether they want to split the activity into markets and how many markets. See
Appendix ? for the details of the directions given to firms in the survey.
9With two markets and two periods (first and second subindices respectively), in per unit terms,
the formula would give the change P01Q01+P11Q11P00Q01+P10Q11 ≠ 1.
10We can alternatively normalize each firm’s starting year index with that year’s industry index.
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on price changes that occurred during the year for materials (raw, parts and energy)
and services. Hourly wage, on the other hand, is computed as total labor cost including
social security payments divided by total hours worked. It is important to point out
that in the empirical section of the paper, we exploit variations in price growths rather
than price levels. Furthermore, we use nominal price growths as we compare or model
variations in prices with those in costs.
During our period of study (1990-2006), the macroeconomic condition was relatively
stable in Spain. There was a brief recession in 1993 followed by a strong recovery (1994-
1999), and growth tapered o  in the remaining years (2000-2006). The microeconomic
picture of prices is shown in Figure 1. In particular, the figure shows the evolution
of indices constructed using the average growth rates of firm-level price, input prices
compared with that of average variable cost index over the sample period. Average
variable cost is constructed using the sum of total wage and material bills divided by
“quantity” (revenue divided by price) and then logged. The growth rates for average
variable costs have been normalized to be 1 and the price index to be 1.147 (1 plus the
average logged margin) in 1990 for comparison.11 Two observations can be highlighted
from this figure. Firstly, input prices have increased at faster rates than average vari-
able cost, revealing the importance of the underlying productivity growth during this
period.12 Secondly, the di erence between the price index and the average variable cost
is a rough approximation to the markup, and this di erence is shown to be relatively
stable over the sample period.
Figure 1 shows the aggregate moderate increase of output prices and costs over time,
yet Table 1 reveals there is significant heterogeneity across firms in these measures.
11When marginal cost is proportional to average variable cost, ln PAV C di ers from ln PMC by a scale
parameter. Here we are simply approximating the evolution of the margin with its starting value
computed as the average of ln PAV C , updated by means of percentage increases equal to the average
rates of firm-level prices and input prices in the sample.
12Recall that average variable cost with a short run returns to scale of 1 is homogenous of degree
one in input prices. The faster rates of growth in input prices then imply that over this period capital
and productivity have increased.
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Specifically, Table 1 presents summary statistics on firm-level growth rates in price,
average variable cost and margins for the full sample.13 Despite the yearly frequency of
our data, we see that there is still a significant share of price inaction, where 36.6% of all
observations involves no change. This gives support to the presence of fixed adjustment
costs in prices. Using the inter-quartile range (IQR) as a measure of dispersion, one
can see that the IQR between inaction and a price change for all industries is much
narrower compared with that in cost and markup changes (3% compared with 11.5%
and 10%). This observation suggests there may be variable costs in adjusting prices
in that firms redress variations in costs that a ect markups with relatively smoother
responses in price changes. Comparing the IQRs for positive versus negative changes
(second and theird rows of the three panelsd), one can see the degree of dispersion is
more sysmetric for cost and markup changes, whereas positive price changes are less
dispersed than negative price changes (2.9% versus 4.8%).
While Table 1 summarizes the distribution of changes in prices, costs and markups,
Figure 2 lets one get a closer look at how prices are adjusted according to variations
in costs. Specifically, it depicts the nonparametric estimation of how firms’ adjustment
in prices over costs varies with lagged markup. The y-axis is the di erence between
the change in price and the change in variable cost computed for each firm and the
x-axis is the lagged di erence in log revenue and log variable cost, taken to be a proxy
for lagged markup. Mathematically, the plot depicts the kernel estimate of E[( p ≠
 avc)|(rt≠1≠ct≠1)]. We then added a horizontal dashed line that intersects the estimate
at the median markup. This figure shows the positive (negative) adjustment in prices is
larger the more a firm falls below (goes above) its median margin. In other words, firms
are reluctant to adjust prices by a large amount unless markups are particularly bad
or “too good”. This observation suggests the importance of considering the adjustment
costs in markup, since without it we would not expect a particular relationship to exist
13These statistics are similar across industries, thus we focus on the interpretations of the numbers
for all industries here but present the summary statistics by industry in Table 1A.
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between the adjustment amounts and past markup, contrary to what Figure 2 tells us.
Another set of statistics we show are on rates of innovation by industry and they
are reported in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) present the average yearly proportion of
observations with product and process innovations. These figures show that firms tend
to introduce process innovations more frequently than product innovations, at the ap-
proximate pace of one innovation every three and four years respectively. Furthermore,
innovation is, as expected, especially important in the more technology-intensive sectors
3 (chemical products), 4 (agriculture and industrial machinery), 5 (electrical goods) and
6 (transport equipment). Lastly, when examining the breakdown of the four mutually
exclusive categories of innovation in Columns (3) - (6), one can see that on average over
half of the observations involve no innovation. And in almost all sectors, introducing
new product only has the lowest fraction of observations compared with introducing
new process only or doing both.
Lastly, we show in Table 3 the results from an OLS regression of the growth of prices
on process and product innovation, controlling for time dummies. None of the e ect is
statistically significant from the simple OLS regression, and we turn to the estimation
results of our model in the next section to elucidate further how prices evolve according
to the state of the market and innovations when taken into consideration variations in
costs.
3. Model
We assume that firm j operates in an imperfectly competitive market and sets the price
of its product with a markup on (short-run) marginal cost. We call short-run marginal
cost the marginal cost of the firm taking capital as given. Specifically, we assume that
observed price meets the relationship
Pjt = P újt exp(ejt) = µjtMCjt exp(ejt),
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where Pjt is observed price, MCjt stands for the (short-run) marginal cost, µjt is the
markup chosen by the firm, P újt is the price corresponding to this markup, and ejt is an
error orthogonal to all information available when the firm takes the decisions. Notice
that, in general, marginal cost is determined endogenously because it depends on the
quantity needed to serve demand at the price set by the firm. Using lowercase letters
to denote logs, the price equation is
pjt = lnµjt +mcjt + ejt. (1)
This equation shows that prices evolve according to marginal cost and markup, both
of which are likely to be impacted by innovation simultaneously. In order to assess this
impact, we develop a model with dynamic pricing where firms choose markup to set
price. Marginal cost includes the e ect of process and product innovations and the
markup is chosen taking innovations as a state variable which impacts profits and
markup adjustment costs.
Our framework can be understood as perfectly tailored to a situation of monopolistic
competition, from which it uses the properties that each firm faces a downward-sloping
demand for its product, and a price change by one firm has a negligible e ect on the
demand of any other firm (Tirole, 1989). But our dynamic pricing modeling, and the
resulting equilibrium "shadow" elasticities, can support competition settings in which
firms interact strategically. It is enough to specify rival prices as state variables and
modify the expectations of firms to also include the behavior of competitors.
We develop the model without adding any assumption to the current models em-
ployed to estimate productivity and markups. We rely on the usual timing distinction
between the moments of which capital and variable factors are chosen. We also ad-
mit that output is imperfectly observed, to which we add the imperfect observation
of price. In the implementation we will use for simplicity a Cobb-Douglas production
function, but any other production function, or even a nonparametric specification, can
be employed.
11
In what follows we first specify demand and production cost, and then discuss the
resulting per-period profitability that depends on the state variables and the markup.
We then focus on the dynamic choice of the optimal markup while sketching (as back-
ground) the capital and R&D investment decisions of the firm. After that, we develop
the econometric model to estimate the parameters relevant to the pricing decision.
Finally, we discuss the modifications of the model when labor input is subject to ad-
justment costs.
3.1 Firm Demand
Firm j’s demand is assumed to depend on own product price (Pjt) and industry prices
(PIt), as well as the specific state of the market for the firm (Djt) and process and
product innovations introduced in the previous period (zjt≠1, djt≠1).14 We introduce
demand heterogeneity unobserved by the econometricianwith a multiplicative persistent
unobservable ”jt. It plays a role similar to productivity in the production function.15
Let’s write
Qjt = Qú exp(ejt) © Q(P újt, PIt, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1) exp(”jt) exp(Ájt),
where Ájt is an error orthogonal to all information when the firm makes decisions and
it renders observed quantity Qjt and demanded quantity di erent.
3.2 Cost
We assume that the firm production function is
Qjt = Qújt exp(Ájt) = F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt) exp(Êjt) exp(Ájt),
14Whether innovations a ect demand and productivity (see below) with a lag is an empirical question,
so we later experiment with a contemporaneous specification as well.
15See Jaumandreu and Yin (2016) for the literature concerned with this heterogeneity and an as-
sessment of the importance of ”jt.
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where Kjt, Ljt, and Mjt stand for capital, labor and materials, and Êjt represents the
Hicks neutral firm- and time-specific level of e ciency. Following the literature we
call Êjt productivity and, symmetrically to ”jt, we assume it is observed by the firm
but unobservable to the econometrician. In contrast, Ájt is an error orthogonal to all
information when the firm makes price and input decisions. This implies that we cannot
directly observe the decided quantity Qújt = F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt) exp(Êjt) for wich the inputs
were chosen. Notice that we assume that the decided output is equal to demand Qújt.
We are largely going to ignore inventories, which in practice balance realized demand
and production. The unique observed quantity Qjt diverges both from demand and
production by Ájt without loss of generality.
The firm takes prices in the input markets as given and minimizes the cost of the
variable factors labor and materials given capital, V Cjt = WjtLjt+PMjtMjt, where Wjt
and PMjt are the prices of labor and materials. Variable cost minimization implies the
existence of the function V Cjt = V C(Kjt,Wjt, PMjt, Qújt/ exp(Êjt)) and marginal cost
can be written as
MCjt = MC(Xjt) exp(≠Êjt), (2)
where Xjt = {Kjt,Mjt,Wjt, PMjt} is a vector of observable variables (see Appendix A).
We will often refer to equation (2) as reflecting the (econometrician’s) observed and
unobserved parts of marginal cost. Cost minimization given capital implies (—Ljt +
—Mjt)MCjt = AV Cjt, where AV Cjt = V CjtQújt and where —Ljt and —Mjt are the output
elasticities of labor and materials.16 Given that capital is fixed in the short-run we
expect the short-run scale elasticity ‹jt = —Ljt + —Mjt to be less than unity.
We assume, as in the subsequent literature to Olley and Pakes (1996), that Êjt
follows a first order Markov process. Our interest lies in an endogenous Êjt, so we let
it depend on not only past productivity but also the shifts induced by the introduction
16First order conditions are MCjt
ˆQújt
ˆLjt
= Wjt and MCjt
ˆQújt
ˆMjt
= PMjt. Multiplying both sides by
Ljt and Mjt, respectively, dividing by Qújt, and aggregating the result, gives the relationship (—Ljt +
—Mjt)MCjt = AV Cjt.
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of process and product innovations.17 That is,
Êjt = g(Êjt≠1, zjt≠1, djt≠1) + ›jt, (3)
where g is a function aimed at picking up both the path dependence of productivity
and the impact of innovations, and ›jt is a random shock mean-independent of all the
arguments in g(·). For additional flexibility we are going to use a time-inhomogeneous
Markov process denoted as gt(·).
3.3 Profits
Our specification of the demand and cost function imply that price over marginal cost,
i.e. the markup µjt =
P újt
MCjt
, is subject to the following equilibrium relationship:
µjt = µ(Qújt, Kjt, PIt,Wjt, PMjt , Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1,Êjt, ”jt).
This functional relation is invertible in Qújt given the other arguments (see Appendix B),
and hence we can write Qújt = ÂQ(µjt, Kjt, PIt,Wjt, PMjt , Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1,Êjt, ”jt). Then
(gross) short-run profits,
fijt = P újtQújt ≠ V Cjt(Kjt,Wjt, PMjt, Qú/ exp(Êjt))
= (µjt
‹jt
≠ 1)V C(Kjt,Wjt, PMjt, ÂQ(µjt, Kjt, PIt,Wjt, PMjt , Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1,Êjt, ”jt)/ exp(Êjt)),
is a function of variables of state and the markup. An important consequence is that the
pricing problem of the firm can be seen as choosing the optimal markup over marginal
cost given the state variables, a dynamic choice we specify next.
17The endogenous productivity literature models productivity shifting with the R&D activities of
firms. See, for example, Doraszelszki and Jaumandreu (2013); Aw et al. (2011); Peters et al. (2016)
and Boler, Moxnes and Ullveit-Moe (2015).
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3.4 Choice of the Markup
We assume that, in period t, the firm choses the investment Ijt in physical capital that
becomes productive the next period, and the investment RDjt that makes innovations
possible. These innovations will impact demand and productivity next period as well.
CI(Ijt) and CR(RDjt) are the cost of the investments. Capital accumulates according
to Kjt = (1≠ d)Kjt≠1 + Ijt≠1, where d is the rate of depreciation. Process and product
innovations, zjt and djt, occur randomly with joint density G(zjt, djt|RDjt) that depends
on the R&D investment of the firm at time t.18
Simultaneously, the firm sets the price of the output by choosing the markup µjt
over marginal cost. The markup determines the production that needs to be carried
out to serve demand. Production employs Ljt and Mjt quantities of variable inputs,
which cab be adjusted without any friction. However, the firm sets the markup µjt by
taking into account that it is subject to adjustments costs of the form
A(µjt, µjt≠1, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1).
We assume the adjustment costs depend on the firm-specific state of demand and can
be impacted by process and/or product innovations (see Appendix C). The introduction
of a process innovation is likely to reduce marginal cost and thus enlarge the margin,
lessening the costs of an upward adjustment of the markup. The introduction of a new
product may facilitate or hinder the change of the markup, depending on consumers’
reception of the price change.
The Bellman equation relevant for the choice of Ijt and RDjt is sketched in Appendix
D. The Bellman equation relevant for the choice of the markup µjt, collecting the state
variables in the vector Sjt = (µjt≠1, Kjt, PIt,Wjt, PMjt, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1,Êjt, ”jt), can be
18Notice that we assume that demand and productivity are impacted by zjt≠1 and djt≠1, innovations
at time t ≠ 1, and hence indirectly by the R&D expenditure at t ≠ 1. Alternatively we could assume
that innovationas at time t are determined by the R&D expenditure at t≠ 1 and impact demand and
productivity at time t.
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written as
V (Sjt) = maxµjt [
3
µjt
v
≠ 1
4
V C(Kjt,Wjt, PMjt, ÂQ(µjt, Kjt, PIt,Wjt, PMjt , Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1,Êjt, ”jt)/ exp(Êjt))
≠A(µjt, µjt≠1, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1)≠ CI(Ijt)≠ CR(RDjt)] + —Et[V (Sjt+1)|Sjt].
From the first order condition of this equation it turns out that optimal markup has
the form
µjt =
÷jt
÷jt ≠ 1(1 + 
µ
jt),
where  µjt = 0 if there are no adjustment costs of the markup (see Appendix E). If
markup is not costly to adjust, dynamic pricing collapses to the well known static
pricing rule based on the elasticity of demand.19 But, under dynamic pricing, prices
are consistent with a "shadow" elasticity that di ers from the elasticity of demand. The
shadow elasticity is the demand elasticity from which the observed markups would be
derived from, i.e. ÷újt such that
÷újt
÷újt≠1 = µjt ).
Consequently, under dynamic pricing we don’t have a simple relationship linking the
markup to demand elasticity. The Bellman equation, however, implies a policy function
relating markup to the state variables. Using lower case letters to denote logs of the
variables, this policy function is
lnµjt =
Ê
ht(lnµjt≠1,kjt, wjt, pMjt, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1,Êjt, ”jt),
where the subindex t indicates that in the function we have replaced the industry
variables by time dummies.
In order to reduce the dimensionality of the problem, in what follows we adopt the
19Computing markups according to the elasticity of demand is a very common practice, and this
computation is even used to estimate marginal cost from prices. These practices are so common that
some researchers have focused in the comparison of the results obtained from this method to the
alternative assessment of markups from marginal cost data (De Loecker and Scott, 2016).
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simplifying assumption that the level of the input prices and the unobservable state
variables Êjt and ”jt are ignorable in the law of motion of markups.20 That is,
E(lnµjt| lnµjt≠1,kjt, wjt, pMjt, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1,Êjt, ”jt) = Âht(lnµjt≠1,kjt, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1),
or
lnµjt = Âht(lnµjt≠1,kjt, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1) + ’ Õjt (4)
4. Econometric Estimation
We started with equation (1), that describes the (log of) price as the result of the (log
of) markup plus the (log of) marginal cost. We have developed an specification for both
components. Equation (2) details marginal cost and equation (3) allows to write the
unobservable productivity component of marginal cost in terms of the Markov process
that depends on innovation. Equation (4) specifies the law of motion of the markup
including the e ects of innovation. Substituting these relationships for the components
of (1) we have
pjt = Âht(lnµjt≠1,kjt, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1)+mc(Xjt)≠gt(Êjt≠1, zjt≠1, djt≠1)+’ Õjt≠›jt+ejt. (5)
Equation (5) elucidates the structural links between innovation and prices.
20That the level of Êjt and ”jt plays a role in the evolution of µjt, once that the innovations that
impact demand and productivity have been controled for, is not very likely. The model, however, could
allow for this possibility at the cost of increasing complexity. On the one hand, the unobservable Êjt
could be replaced in a similar way to what is done in the marginal cost function. The unobservable
”jt could also be replaced using the inversion of a demand relationship.
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4.1 A System
Estimation of (5) faces several econometric problems. First, lagged productivity Êjt≠1
is an unobservable. Second, lagged markup µjt≠1 cannot be observed directly either.
Third, there is an obvious identification problem a ecting the impacts of innovation.
These e ects cannot be separated since they enter two additive components of the
equation (functions Âht(·) and gt(·)) which is natural to model and estimate nonpara-
metrically.
The first problem can be addressed by using an Olley and Pakes (1996)/Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) procedure, which is replacing the unobservable Êjt≠1 by the inversion
of an input demand which contains it. For example, from the first order conditions of
the solution of the dynamic problem for variable inputs we know that the demand for
materials is Mjt = M(Kjt,Wjt, PMjt, P újt/µjt,Êjt). The fourth argument of this demand
is marginal revenue (which is equivalent to marginal cost due to profit maximization).
Solving the demand for lagged unobserved productivity we can write
Êjt≠1 = Âf(Kjt≠1,Wjt≠1, PMjt,Mjt≠1, pújt≠1 ≠ lnµjt≠1).
This solves the problem of unobservable productivity, although at the cost of introducing
in the equation one additional time the unobserved markup µjt≠1.21
We address the second and third problems as follows. We do not observe µjt, but
most databases allow one to compute the price average cost ratio, a variable closely
related to the markup. E ectively, if the database contains measures of revenue Rjt
and variable costs V Cjt
ln Rjt
V Cjt
= ln Pjt
V Cjt/Qjt
= ln Pjt
V Cjt/Qújt
Qjt
Qújt
= ln
P újt
AV Cjt
+ Ájt + ejt.
If there are no adjustments costs of labor we know that AV Cjt = ‹jtMCjt, so from
21This substitution seems also to introduce in the equation the problem of unobserved pújt. We will
see below that this is not the case.
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the price-average cost ratio we get an expression for the markup and the value of the
elasticity of scale up to an uncorrelated error. In logs
rjt ≠ vcjt = ≠ ln ‹jt + lnµjt + Ájt + ejt.
We use this fact to write an additional equation that solves the identification problem
and, at the same time, gives a way to estimate the unobservable µjt≠1. We estimate the
system
rjt ≠ vcjt = ≠ ln ‹jt + ht(rjt≠1 ≠ vcjt≠1 + ln ‹jt≠1, kjt, Djt, zjt, djt) + ’jt + Ájt + ejt,
pjt = ht(rjt≠1 ≠ vcjt≠1 + ln ‹jt≠1, kjt, Djt, zjt, djt) +mc(Xjt)
≠ gt(f(Kjt≠1,Wjt≠1, PMjt,Mjt≠1, pjt≠1 ≠ rjt≠1 + vcjt≠1 ≠ ln ‹jt), zjt≠1, djt≠1)
+ ’jt ≠ ›jt + ejt,
where ht(·) is the conditional expectation of lnµjt on the included variables (we integrate
the error Ájt≠1 + ejt≠1) and f(·) is the conditional expectation of Êjt≠1 on the included
variables (we integrate the error Ájt≠1).22
The first equation cannot in general by itself provide an estimation of the parameter
of scale ‹jt. This is in some sense the traditional reason that prevents the use of the
price-average cost ratio to assess markups despite its closeness to what we want to
measure. However, when an estimate of the lagged markup is included, the second
equation can provide a consistent estimate of the input elasticities of the inputs, and
hence ‹jt. As a result, the two equations together provide identification.23
The system of equations (6) constitute a model for the consistent estimation of en-
22Notice that pújt≠1 ≠ lnµjt≠1
= pjt≠1 ≠ ejt≠1 ≠ (rjt≠1 ≠ vcjt≠1 + ln ‹jt ≠ Ájt≠1 ≠ ejt≠1)
= pjt≠1 ≠ rjt≠1 + vcjt≠1 ≠ ln ‹jt + Ájt≠1.
23Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) usedMRjt = Pjt(1≠ 1÷jt ), modeling ÷jt by means of a polyno-
mial on Djt and Pjt. The elasticity may be understood as a shadow elasticity. While this is a solution
to the the unobservability ofMCjt ©MRjt circunmscribed to one equation, it gives probably a poorer
identified estimate of the markups. Our solution here draws on Jaumandreu and Yin (2016).
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dogenous productivity and markups under imperfect competition and dynamic pricing.
Markups are estimated simultaneously and used to specify the inverted input demand
that is needed to estimate the parameters of the cost function (production function).
It includes as a particular case the solution of static pricing, so we can test for the
presence of dynamic pricing. But before we deal with the empirical specification, we
further examine the case where labor is a not perfectly variable input due to adjustment
costs.
4.2 Adjustment Costs of Labor
If there are adjustment costs of labor, then the problem of cost minimization becomes
also a dynamic problem and cannot be separated from the dynamic choice of the price.
Intuitively, if the amount of labor that it uses today is going to a ect labor costs tomor-
row, then the firm needs to take this into account in choosing today’s price and hence
output in relation to tomorrow’s price and output. The cost minimization problem can
be however written as
MinEt[
ÿ
s
—s(Wjt+sLjt+s + PMjt+sMjt+s + AL(Ljt+s, Ljt+s)]
s.t.F (Kjt+s, Ljt+s,Mjt+s) = Qújt+s/ exp(Êjt+s), s = 0...Œ.
The infinite sequence of outputs are the productions (implicitly) decided in the simul-
taneous dynamic choice of the sequence of prices. The Lagrangean multiplier of the
production constraint at time t + s can be seen as the marginal cost corresponding to
the variation of output Qújt+s.
Let’s focus on s = 0. The first order condition for labor can be written as
MCjt
ˆFjt
ˆLjt
= Wjt +
ˆALjt
ˆLjt
+ —Et[
ˆALjt+1
ˆLjt
|Sjt, Ljt≠1]
= Wjt(1 +
1
Wjt
ˆALjt
ˆLjt
+ — 1
Wjt
Et[
ˆALjt+1
ˆLjt
|Sjt, Ljt≠1]) = Wjt(1 + Ljt),
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where  Ljt represents the gap between the wage and the shadow price of labor under
adjustment costs. Similarly, there is a first order condition for materials
MCjt
ˆQjt
ˆMjt
= PMjt.
The variable cost that results from the choice of the firm can be written as V Cjt =
V C(Kjt,Wjt(1 + Ljt), PMjt, Qújt/ exp(Êjt)) and is contingent on the choice of the firm.
The Bellman equation for the choice of µjt is still valid, but the solution of the prob-
lem of cost minimization that raises variable cost and the choice of the price are non
separable.
Adding the two first order conditions we can see that, under adjustment costs of
labor, the relationship between marginal and average variable cost becomes
‹jtMCjt =
WjtLjt + PMjtMjtjt
Qújt
(1 + sLjt Ljt)
= AV Cjt(1 + sLjt Ljt),
where sLjt is the share of wages in variable costs. As a consequence, the statistical
model becomes slightly more complicated. The model for the margin is
rjt ≠ vcjt = ◊ ln(1 + sLjt Ljt)≠ ln ‹jt + lnµjt + Ájt + ejt,
where parameter ◊ accounts for the fact that observed average variable costs are likely to
already include part of the adjustment costs.24 On the other hand, the second equation
of the system should be also corrected because now marginal cost should be specified
in terms of the shadow cost of labor.25
24That is, AV Cjt(1 + sLjt Ljt) = AV Cobsjt (1 + sLjt Ljt)◊.
25The correction can be again approximated by including the term ◊ ln(1 + sLjt Ljt).
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4.3 Detailed Specification
To take equations in (6) to the data, four pieces need to be specified: the observable
component of marginal cost, the Markov process that governs the endogenous produc-
tivity process, the flexible form for the markup and the estimate of the adjustment costs
of labor.
Let us start with the marginal cost function. We consider for simplicity the Cobb-
Douglas production function
qjt = —0 + —kkjt + —lljt + —mmjt + Êjt,
which gives the short-run marginal cost function in terms of materials as
mcjt = Ÿ≠ —kkjt + (1≠ —l ≠ —m)mjt + (1≠ —l)pMjt + —lwjt ≠ Êjt, (7)
where Ÿ = ≠—0≠ ln(—l + —m)≠ —l ln —l + —l ln —m. Notice that the use of a cobb-douglas
will make the short-run elasticity of scale a constant: ‹ = —l + —m.
For the productivity process we use the inhomogeneous Markov process Êjt = —t +
g(Êjt≠1, zjt, djt) + ›jt. To replace Êjt≠1 we use the lagged inverted demand for materials
fjt = ≠—kkjt≠1 ≠ (1 ≠ —l ≠ —m)mjt≠1 + —l(wjt ≠ pjt) + (1 ≠ —l)(pmjt ≠ pjt) ≠ ln ÷≠1÷ ,
referred in what follows with the shorthand fjt. Specifying gt(·) as time dummies plus
a polynomial with powers of fjt≠1, zjt, djt and their interactions we have:26
26We implicitly collapse the constant of the unknown function in the constant of the equation.
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Êjt = —t + g(fjt≠1, zjt, djt) + ›jt
= —t + “1fjt≠1 + “2f 2jt≠1 + “3f 3jt≠1 + “4zjt + “5djt + “6zjt · djt
+ “7fjt≠1 · zjt + “8f 2jt≠1 · zjt
+ “9fjt≠1 · djt + “10f 2jt≠1 · djt
+ “11fjt≠1 · zjt · djt + “12f 2jt≠1 · zjt · djt + ›jt. (8)
Next we set the law of the motion of the markup. We specify ht(·) as dummies
plus a polynomial of order three in the lagged markup, capital, the firm-level state of
the market indicator mdjt or market dynamism, product and process innovations, and
interactions between the lagged markup and mdjt, zjt≠1 and djt≠1 :
ht(·) = —Õt + ⁄1(rjt≠1 ≠ cjt≠1 + ln ‹) + ⁄2(rjt≠1 ≠ cjt≠1 + ln ‹)2 + ⁄3(rjt≠1 ≠ cjt≠1 + ln ‹)3
+ ⁄4kjt + ⁄5mdjt + ⁄6zjt + ⁄7djt (9)
+ ⁄8(rjt≠1 ≠ cjt≠1 + ln ‹)mdjt + ⁄9(rjt≠1 ≠ cjt≠1 + ln ‹)zjt + ⁄10(rjt≠1 ≠ cjt≠1 + ln ‹)djt.
In the case without adjustment costs, that we test against our main specification, we
use
h(·) = ln ÷jt
÷jt ≠ 1 = ln
1 + exp(yjt⁄)
exp(yjt⁄)
= ln(1 + exp(yjt⁄))≠ yjt⁄,
where yjt = {mdjt, djt≠1, zjt≠1}. The function makes the markup equal to the elasticity
of demand and restricts this elasticity to be greater than one while allows for its cyclical
fluctuation according to the firm-level state of the market indicator mdjt or market
dynamism and the introduction of innovations..
Lastly, recall that the relevant markup rjt≠ cjt + ln ‹ changes to rjt≠ cjt≠ ◊ ln(1 +
sLjt Ljt)+ln ‹ when we additionally consider adjustment costs in labor, where ◊ captures
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the share of adjustment costs not included in the observed average variable costs, sLjt
the share of wage bill in variable costs, and Ljt the gap between the wage and the shadow
price of labor. The term ◊ ln(1 + sLjt Ljt) is also included in the second equation to
correct the expression for marginal cost. To estimate  Ljt we use of the fact that under
Cobb-Douglas production function, the ratio of first order conditions gives
PMjtMjt
WjtLjt
= —M
—L
(1 + jt).
If we further assume that the average of the gaps tends to cancel over time, we have
that[
1
—M
—L
2
= 1Tj
q
j
PMjtMjt
WjtLjt
. Hence, an estimate of  jt is
‚ jt = PMjtMjtWjtLjt[1—M
—L
2 ≠ 1.
We construct ln(1+sLjt ‚ jt) using the observed cost shares. A possible alternative is the
use of the share of temporary workers in total employment (temporary plus permanent).
4.4 Nonlinear GMM
We plug expressions (7), (8) and (9) into (6) to estimate the system of equations by
nonlinear GMM. Write the residuals ‹1jt = ’jt + Ájt + ejt and ‹2jt = ’jt ≠ ›jt + ejt as a
function of the variables xjt and the vector ◊ of parameters to estimate. Stacking the
moments for each firm j and adding them, the GMM problem is
min
◊
SWWWU
1
N
q
j
A1(zj)‹1j(xj, ◊, )
1
N
q
j
A2(zj)‹2j(xj, ◊)
TXXXV
Õ
„W
SWWWU
1
N
q
j
A1(zj)‹1j(xj, ◊)
1
N
q
j
A2(zj)‹2j(xj, ◊)
TXXXV
where A1(·) is an L1◊Tj and A2(·) an L2◊Tj matrix of functions of exogenous variables
zj (a vector partially overlapped with xj); ‹1j(·) and ‹2j(·) are the Tj ◊ 1 vectors of
residuals, and N is the number of firms. L = L1 + L2 denotes the total number of
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moments that we use and Tj the number of observations for firm j. Notice that the
subscript on A(·) implies that we use di erent set of instruments for each of the two
equations in the system.
For the first step of GMM we use the consistent weighting matrix
„W =
SWWWU
( 1N
q
j
A1(zj)A1(zj)Õ)≠1 0
0 ( 1N
q
j
A2(zj)A2(zj)Õ)≠1
TXXXV ,
and for the second the optimal weighting matrix. We present first stage coe cients and
use the second to compute the specification test. Stacking all moments of a firm in the
vector g(wj, ◊) =
SWU A1(zj)v1j(xj, ◊)
A2(zj)v2j(xj, ◊)
TXV , where wj is the union of vectors xj and zj, the
GMM problem can be more compactly written as
min
◊
[ 1
N
ÿ
j
g(wj, ◊)]Õ„W [ 1
N
ÿ
g(wj, ◊)],
We estimate the assymptotic variance as
Avar(‚◊) = (GÕWG)≠1GÕWDWG(GÕWG)≠1
N
,
whereG = E[“◊g(wi, ◊0)], W is the probability limit of „W, andD = E[g(wj, ◊0)g(wj, ◊0)Õ],
replacing them by the estimated counterparts.
4.5 Instruments
Let’s discuss the moments used to estimate system (6). The basic instruments that
we use for the first equation include: constant, time dummies (15), lagged markup,
the market dynamism variable and the two dummies of lagged innovation (a total of
20 instruments). The basic instruments that we use for the second equation include:
the previous 20 instruments plus a complete polynomial of order three in the lagged
input prices (wjt≠1, pmjt≠1) plus the interactions of this polynomial with the dummies of
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innovation (a total of 47 instruments). To these basic instruments we find useful to add
lagged capital, labor and/or materials and lagged output price and perhaps a few powers
of one or two of these variables. Which aditional instruments are convenient changes a
little from industry to industry, what we interpret as sensitivity to errors in variables.
In some industries we also find useful to employ a sum of lagged R&D expenditures
to weight innovations (the expenditures accumulated since the latest inovation when a
new innovation takes place). We add a minimum of 3 an a maximum of 10 instruments,
what makes a total that ranges from 70 to 77 instruments.
We have to estimate 4 parameters that enter nonlinearly: —k, —l, —m, the parameters
of the marginal cost/production functions, and ◊, the parameter on the labor adjustment
cost. We have 53 other parameters that enter linearly (10 coe cients from the law of
motion for markup, 32 coe cients from the two sets of constant and time dummies that
correspond to each equation, and 11 polynomial coe cients in the productivity process).
We estimate the 53 parameters by “concentrating them out.” As the parameters to
estimate are 57, this gives overydentifying restrictions that range from 13 to 20 (see the
table of GMM results) and that we use to test the specification.
5. Estimation Results
5.1. Model Comparison
We conduct testing of the static and the dynamic pricing model and find that the latter
fits the data better, and the details are to be completed.
5.2. Estimation Results under Dynamic Pricing
The estimation results of the system of equations (6) under dynamic pricing allows us
to examine the impacts of innovation on prices. For the rest of this section, we first
present key model estimates (Table 4) and then derive the implications for productivity
growth, markup and price variations due to the impact of innovation (Table 5).
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Columns (1)-(3) of Table 4 contain the results for marginal cost/production function
parameters, Column (4) reports the degree of adjustment cost in labor, and the last
two columns present over-identifying test statistics and p-values. As noted in the table,
the set of instruments varies across the industries due to potential measurement errors.
Overall, the specification test for overidentifying restrictions or validity of the moment
conditions passed in 9/10 industries at the 5% level.
The parameters in the marginal cost/production functions in Columns (2) to (4)
are sensible, although four sectors (2, 5, 6, and 9) have imprecise capital elasticities.
Short run returns to scale are either close to one or slightly exceed one. The labor
adjustment cost parameter ◊ in Column (4) informs one the fraction of adjustment
costs not included in the observed average variable costs. The estimates show that this
parameter is positive and significant at the 10% level in six industries, and they range
between 4.5% and 61.2%.
The next part of our analysis is to summarize the relationship among productivity,
markup and prices resulting from innovation using the GMM estimation results. Recall
that innovation a ects productivity and thus marginal costs. Furthermore, there exists
adjustment costs in the markup under dynamic pricing, therefore cost changes induced
by innovation may not be perfectly passed onto prices. To capture this complex rela-
tionship, our empirical model specifies a flexible functional form for the productivity
process and the markup policy function that involves many interaction terms. The
generality comes at a cost of an immediate analysis of the impact of innovation on
prices. Thus in order to assess how predicted price change occurs according to produc-
tivity change and adjustment costs in margin due to innovation, we first summarize
the distributions of productivity, margin and price changes separately by industry and
innovation category. We then compare the changes to arrive at the overall picture.
Specifically, to get at the relationship between innovation and productivity, we first
compute the firm specific productivity growth rate, given by  Êjt = Êjt ≠ Êjt≠1. Then
within each industry we split the samples into observations corresponding to time peri-
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ods without any kind of innovation, with the introduction of a process innovation only,
product innovation only, and both kind of innovations. Finally, we calculate weighted
averages of the rates of growth, using firms sales shares lagged two periods as weights,
and replicating the observations for the small firms (10-200 workers) as indicated by
the known starting representativeness in the survey of small firms for a representative
comparison.27 The relationship between innovation and the margin, as well as price, is
computed in a similar manner. Lastly, we compare the changes across prices, costs and
markups in the respective innovation category.
Average productivity changes are reported in Columns (1) to (4) of Table 4 according
to innovation type. We find that absent any innovation, there are exogenous improve-
ments in productivity in all but one industry, and the overall average is 1 percentage
point increase a year. Process only innovation is associated with the most productiv-
ity increase as expected (1.9 percentage points a year on average). However, we do
not expect a particular relationship to exist between productivity change and product
innovation–it remains largely an empirical question. When there is only product inno-
vation, productivity increases in 6/10 industries, decreases quite a bit in industries 1
and 2, and the rest changes little. In the end the overall average is small and close to
one tenth of a percentage point. As for firms that introduce both process and product
innovation, one sees productivity increase in some industries (especially large in indus-
try 1 and 5), near zero in some others and negative in the rest. Together they amount
to an increase of 1.7 percenage points a year on average. It is important to point out
here that changes from when firm introduces both types of innovation are not simple
additions of what happens when firms innovate separately. The overall combined ef-
fects are likely due to either complementarity or substitutability of di erent types of
innovation, though the underlying mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper.
These productivity changes induced by innovation translates into reduction in marginal
27Since the proportions were approximately 5% and 70% this implies replicating the smallest firms
14 times.
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cost, but how much of the reduction is transmitted to price changes depends on the
behavior of the markup. To illustrate this, Columns (5)-(8) of Table 4 report aver-
age margin changes by innovation category. These figures show that margin decreases
among non-innovators except for industry 3. With process innovation, firms tend to
take advantage to enlarge the margin in 6/10 industries. As for product innovation,
half of the industries also enlarge their margins as a result but the magnitudes are much
milder compared with those under process innovation. Changes in the “dual-innovator”
type tend to be negative overall and close to zero in two industries.
What are the implications of changes in productivity and the margin for the pre-
dicted price changes then? These numbers are reported in Columns (9) - (12), computed
as average productivity change subtracted from the average margin change. For exam-
ple, for non-innovators of industry 1, the predicted price change is ≠0.013 ≠ 0.001 =
≠0.014. Taking a look at the industry average reported in the last row at first, one
can see that price changes amount to be similar between non-innovators and process
only innovators, while product only innovators see a mild decrease in price growth, and
dual-innovators see the most negative price growth.
The overall pattern can seen more clearly in Figure 3 where we have depicted statis-
tics in Columns (1) - (8) graphically by innovation categories. The x-axis depects
changes in the growth rates of prices, the gray bars represent reductions/increases in
prices due to productivity changes induced by innovation and the black bars denote
those due to margin changes induced by innivation. Overall, Panel A shows that for
non-innovators, the exogenous productivity gain is passed onto prices in the forms of
reduced margins in all but industry 3 (chemical products). Panel B reveals that pro-
cess only innovators take advantage of the large overall gain in productivity to also
increase the margin, which explains why the overall predicted change in prices turn
out to be small and similar to that of the non-innovators. Panel C further hightlights
the heterogeneous responses for product innovators across industries in their productiv-
ity and margin changes. The mild overall price decrease in the product only category
29
is mainly driven by the industries that have opposite movements in productivity and
margin change (industries 2, 3, 6, 9 and 10). The figure also shows that productivity
responses are generally larger than those in the margins, consistent with firms’ concern
over consumers’ reception of the new good.
The last set of results examine how price changes are related to firm-specific macroe-
conomic conditions. In Table 5, we again report average productivity, margin and price
changes by industry, but according to observations where firms report market condi-
tion to be contractionary or expansionary. Averaging across industries, one can see
that firms experience the most productivity and margin increase during boom times.
The overall predicted price change is negative in the end, meaning productivity increase
(cost reduction) outpaced margin increases, and more so during recessionary than boom
times.
In conclusion, our estimation results reveal that absent innovation, prices decrease
by 1.5 percentage point a year across industries on average. This is the result of firms
passing exogenous productivity improvement onto consumers in the form of lower mar-
gins. Firms that introduce process innovations only have a similar rate of price decrease
of 1.7 percentage points a year. Despite garnering a larger productivity increase (reduc-
tion in cost), these firms take advantage of process innovations to enlarge the markup.
Product innovation sometimes decreases price, and other times increases it, giving an
average of almost zero change. Lastly, product innovations implemented together with
process innovations tend to decrease price at the highest rate of 2.5 percentage points.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the impact of process and product innovations on prices set by
firms. This impact is modeled to be the result of two related processes: 1) the way
in which innovation a ects productivity and hence marginal cost and 2) the extent to
which firms pass changes in costs onto prices via markup when there are adjustment
costs. From this dynamic pricing problem with adjustment costs in markup, we derive
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a set of equations that is then estimated with yearly prices and innovations reported
by an unbalanced panel of Spanish manufacturing firms.
Our estimation results show that markup is highly persistent and procyclical. Pro-
cess innovations increase productivity and thus decrease marginal costs as expected.
However, since cost reductions are only imperfectly passed through to prices, firms take
advantage of process innovations by increasing their markups. Product innovators are
careful with pricing new or improved goods, they tend to counterbalance resulting cost
increases with margin decreases. We believe the overall findings in the paper contribute
to the scarce literature on innovation and firm-level prices, and that the methodology
can be applied to other countries for more empirical documentations on the impact of
innovation on prices.
Appendices
Appendix A
Variable cost minimization implies the cost function
Cjt = C(Kjt,Wjt, PMjt, Qújt/ exp(Êjt)).
Marginal cost is
MCjt =
ˆCjt
ˆQújt
= ˆC
ˆ(Qújt/ exp(Êjt))
(Kjt,Wjt, PMjt, Qújt/ exp(Êjt)) exp(≠Êjt).
On the other hand, by Shephard’s lemma, optimal materials choice conditional on
output is
Mjt =
ˆCjt
ˆPMjt
= CPM (Kjt,Wjt, PMjt, Qújt/ exp(Êjt)).
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Inverting this latest equation for Qújt/ exp(Êjt), and using the resulting expression to
replace Qújt/ exp(Êjt) in marginal cost, we get
MCjt = MC(Kjt,Mjt,Wjt, PMjt) exp(≠Êjt) = MC(Xjt) exp(≠Êjt),
where Xjt = {Kjt,Mjt,Wjt, PMjt} is a vector of observable variables. Variable Mjt
could be alternatively replaced by Ljt.
Appendix B
The markup µjt =
P újt
MCjt
= ‹jt
P (Qújt,PIt,Djt,zjt≠1,djt≠1,”jt)Qújt
C(Kjt,Wjt,PMjt,Qújt/ exp(Êjt))
, where P (·) is inverse demand
and ‹jt the scale parameter, is a monotonic function of Qújt given the rest of variables,
and the inverse function Qúit = ÂQ(µjt, Kjt, PIt,Wjt, PMjt , Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1,Êjt, ”jt) exists.
Monotonocity holds because the derivative ˆµjtˆQújt = ≠
µjt
Qújt
( 1÷jt +
1
‹jt
≠ 1), where ÷jt stands
for the (absolute value of) elasticity of demand, is negative if ‹jt < ÷jt÷jt≠1 . The condition
is likely to hold everywhere.
Appendix C
What are the costs of changing the markup that the firm compares with the induced
increase in profits? Lets define µújt =
P út≠1
MCújt
as the markup that will result if the firm
chooses not to change the price. Marginal cost MCút is hence the cost that results
from a purely “passive” change in cost, that follows from the change in cost induced by
input prices variation, innovations, the state of demand and productivity (i.e. without
adjusting price and hence quantity). This markup may be greater or smaller than the
markup µjt≠1, depending whether the net e ect of the change in input prices, innovation,
state of demand and productivity enlarge or deteriorate the margin.
The cost-relevant change of markup that the firm must face is hence lnµjt ≠ lnµújt,
that is from the "pasive" markup to the chosen markup. It is the cost of this change
what should be compared to the derived increase in profits. This change lnµjt ≠ lnµújt
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can be related to observed change in markup in the following way:
lnµjt ≠ lnµújt = lnµjt ≠ lnµjt≠1 + (lnMCújt ≠ lnMCjt≠1),
where the term (lnMCújt ≠ lnMCjt≠1) represents the passive change induced in the
markup µjt≠1. In the specification of adjustment costs is hence important to allow for
the separated impact of all the variables that determine the passive jump ln MC
ú
jt
MCjt≠1 .
Appendix D
Profits can be written as fijt = P (Qújt, PIt, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1, ”jt)Qújt≠V C(Kjt,Wjt, PMjt, Qújt/ exp(Êjt)),
where Qújt = F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt) exp(Êjt). The Bellman equation relevant for the choice of
Ijt and RDjt is
V (Sjt) = max
Ijt,RDjt
[fi(Kjt, Ljt,Mjt, PIt,Wjt, PMjt, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1,Êjt, ”jt)
≠A(µjt, µjt≠1, Djt, zjt≠1, djt≠1)≠ CI(Ijt)≠ CR(RDjt)] + —Et[V (Sjt+1)|Sjt],
where, in computing the expectation, it is taken into account that G(zjt, djt|RDjt).
Appendix E
First order condition for µjt, using the functions indexed as shorthand, is
1
‹jt
V Cjt +
A
µjt
‹jt
≠ 1
B
ˆV Cjt
ˆQújt
ˆQújt
ˆµjt
≠ ˆAjt
ˆµjt
+ —Et[
ˆVjt+1
ˆµjt
|Sjt] = 0,
where replacing ˆQ
ú
jt
ˆµjt
by ≠ Qújt
µjt( 1÷jt+
1
‹jt
≠1) and
ˆVjt+1
ˆµjt
by ≠ˆAjt+1ˆµjt , we have
1
‹jt
V Cjt ≠
A
µjt
‹jt
≠ 1
B
ˆV Cjt
ˆQújt
Qújt
µjt( 1÷jt +
1
‹jt
≠ 1) ≠
ˆAjt
ˆµjt
≠ —Et[ˆAjt+1
ˆµjt
|Sjt] = 0.
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Reordering, this gives
µjt =
÷jt
÷jt ≠ 1(1≠ (
1
÷jt
+ 1
‹jt
≠ 1)µjt‹jt
V Cjt
ˆAjt
ˆµjt
≠ ( 1
÷jt
+ 1
‹jt
≠ 1)µjt‹jt
V Cjt
—Et[
ˆAjt+1
ˆµjt
|Sjt]),
or
µjt =
÷jt
÷jt ≠ 1(1 + 
µ
jt).
34
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Figure 1: Evolution of Price, Input Cost and Variable Cost Indices
Figure 2: Adjustment of Price to Cost according to Lagged Margin
Figure 3: Yearly Rate of Price Changes due to Productivity and Margin Chnages
-0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
In
du
st
ry
Panel	A.	Non-innovators
Change	due	to	Productivity Change	due	to	Margin
-0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Panel	B.	Process	Only	 Innovators
Change	due	to	Productivity Change	due	to	Margin
-0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Panel	C.	Product	Only	Innovators
Change	due	to	Productivity Change	due	to	Margin
-0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Panel	D.	Prod	&	Proc	Innovators
Change	due	to	Productivity Change	due	to	Margin
Table 1: Percentiles of Growth Rates (1990-2006)
10th pct 25th pct 50th pct 75th pct 90th pct IQR Mean Std
 p
All (100%) -0.010 0.000 0.007 0.030 0.049 0.030 0.015 0.050
 p| p > 0 (51.6%) 0.011 0.020 0.030 0.049 0.070 0.029 0.041 0.041
 p| p < 0 (11.8%) -0.117 -0.066 -0.030 -0.018 -0.010 0.048 -0.055 0.072
 AVC
All (100%) -0.120 -0.04 0.019 0.077 0.163 0.115 0.020 0.138
 AVC| AVC > 0 (65%) 0.012 0.029 0.061 0.119 0.213 0.090 0.090 0.105
 AVC| AVC < 0 (35%) -0.210 -0.110 -0.050 -0.020 -0.010 0.092 -0.090 0.105
 Margin
All (100%) -0.13 -0.060 -0.000 0.045 0.121 0.100 -0.010 0.131
 Margin| Margin > 0 (54.4%) 0.008 0.021 0.050 0.106 0.197 0.085 0.080 0.100
 Margin| Margin < 0 (45.6%) -0.200 -0.110 -0.050 -0.020 -0.010 0.084 -0.090 0.103
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Table 3: OLS of Price Growth on Innovation
Industry Constant Process Product Sample Size
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) SEE Obs. Firms
1. Metals and metal products 0.008 -0.004 0.003 0.050 2365 313
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
2. Non-metallic minerals -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.057 1270 163
(0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
3. Chemical products 0.014 -0.003 0.001 0.053 2168 299
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
4. Agric. And ind. Machinery 0.023 -0.002 0.003 0.026 1411 178
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
5. Electrical and electronic products 0.015 -0.004 -0.004 0.045 1505 178
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
6. Transport equipment 0.011 -0.007 0.005 0.030 1206 161
(-0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
7. Food, drink and tobacco 0.037 -0.001 0.002 0.053 2455 327
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
8. Textile, leather and shoes 0.015 -0.001 0.002 0.042 2368 335
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
9. Timber and furniture 0.022 0.001 0.01 0.030 1445 207
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
10. Paper and printing products 0.018 -0.007 0.005 0.069 1414 183
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
All regressions control for time dummies. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
Table 4: GMM Estimation of the System (Markup and Price Equation)
Elasticities (SE) Adj. Cost Overidentifying
Restrictions Test
Industry Capital Labor Materials (s.e.) ‰2 (df) p value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Metals and metal products 0.153 0.277 0.704 0.277 3.756 0.994
(0.052) (0.052) (0.063) (0.142) (13)
2. Non-metallic minerals 0.090 0.347 0.710 0.299 11.272 0.939
(0.058) (0.058) (0.141) (0.256) (20)
3. Chemical products 0.118 0.216 0.762 0.119 32.542 0.019
(0.045) (0.045) (0.057) (0.208) (19)
4. Agric. And ind. Machinery 0.098 0.271 0.802 0.255 17.723 0.340
(0.039) (0.039) (0.055) (0.139) (16)
5. Electrical and electronic products 0.063 0.373 0.631 0.175 27.831 0.145
(0.043) (0.043) (0.077) (0.120) (21)
6. Transport equipment 0.076 0.321 0.704 0.438 23.296 0.056
(0.050) (0.050) (0.099) (0.043) (14)
7. Food, drink and tobacco 0.160 0.471 0.448 0.472 10.116 0.812
(0.054) (0.054) (0.093) (0.159) (15)
8. Textile, leather and shoes 0.075 0.367 0.644 0.082 10.300 0.891
(0.031) (0.031) (0.069) (0.130) (17)
9. Timber and furniture 0.054 0.266 0.700 0.045 18.948 0.395
(0.036) (0.036) (0.079) (0.188) (18)
10. Paper and printing products 0.170 0.226 0.642 0.612 12.724 0.469
(0.050) (0.050) (0.069) (0.237) (13)
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Table 6: Market Conditions and Price Changes
Avg prod change Avg margin change Avg predicted price change
Industry
md=0 md=1 md=0 md=1 md=0 md=1
1. Metals and metal products 0.000 0.066 -0.015 -0.004 -0.015 -0.070
2. Non-metallic minerals 0.04 0.000 -0.031 0.010 -0.071 0.010
3. Chemical products 0.011 0.002 -0.039 -0.002 -0.050 -0.004
4. Agric. and ind. machinery -0.011 0.010 -0.024 0.016 -0.013 0.006
5. Electrical and electronic products 0.019 0.034 -0.022 0.008 -0.041 -0.026
6. Transport equipment 0.000 0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 -0.007
7. Food, drink and tobacco 0.007 0.007 0.011 -0.010 0.004 -0.017
8. Textile, leather and shoes 0.002 0.024 -0.024 -0.003 -0.026 -0.027
9. Timber and furniture -0.016 0.030 -0.025 0.004 -0.009 -0.026
10. Paper and printing products 0.017 0.008 0.009 -0.003 -0.008 -0.011
Average 0.007 0.018 -0.017 0.001 -0.024 -0.017
